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Ahrends, Fabian Herweg, Matthias Kr¨ akel, and Patrick Schmitz.Abstract: Conﬁrmation bias, which refers to unintentional and unknowing selectivity in
the use of evidence, belongs to the major problems faced by organizations. In this article,
we discuss job rotation as a natural solution to this problem. In a nutshell, adopting job
rotation provides an organization that is plagued by conﬁrmation bias with a more reliable
informational footing upon which to base its decisions. Job rotation, however, also comes
with a cost, e.g. a loss of productivity or a disruption of work ﬂows. We study this trade-oﬀ
and identify conditions under which job rotation and specialization are each optimal.
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21 Introduction
“If one were to attempt to identify a single problematic aspect of human reasoning that deserves
attention above all others, the conﬁrmation bias would have to be among the candidates for consid-
eration.”
– Raymond S. Nickerson
Conﬁrmation bias refers to unintentional and unknowing selectivity in the acquisition
and use of evidence. Ample empirical evidence supports the view that once one has come
to believe in a position on an issue, one’s primary purpose becomes that of justifying or
defending that position.2 In consequence, regardless of whether treatment of evidence was
evenhanded before the position was taken, it can become highly biased afterward. Though
conﬁrmation bias is considered as one of the most widely accepted notions of inferential errors,
as suggested by the above quote by Nickerson (1999), its implications for organizational
design have not been subject of thorough formal investigation.3 This is surprising because in
organizations there seems to be ample room for conﬁrmation bias to arise and in consequence
to adversely aﬀect intra-organizational decision processes and organizational performance.
In this paper, we aim at making a ﬁrst step toward drawing out potential responses of
organizational design to conﬁrmation bias and its eﬀects.
One aspect of organizational life where conﬁrmation bias has major impact immediately
comes to mind: performance appraisal. In the community practicing performance appraisal,
conﬁrmation bias is also known as the horns-and-halo eﬀect, which refers to supervisors’
tendency to judge employees as either good or bad, and then to seek evidence that supports
2See Nickerson (1999) for an excellent survey.
3Other behavioral biases have been considered in the literature on organizational theory: leniency, fa-
voritism, or centrality bias on the side of supervisors, reference-dependent preferences, inequity aversion,
or violation of procedure-neutrality on the side of employees, just to name a few. Surveys regarding the
former and the latter kind of biases in the context of organizations are found in Prendergast and Topel
(1993) and Camerer and Malmendier (2009), respectively.
3that opinion.4 Many, if not most performance measures regarding a ﬁrm’s employees are
subjective rather than objective in nature.5 This makes performance appraisal a process
by which humans judge other humans, thereby opening the door for behavioral biases and
inferential errors to enter and – more importantly – to distort this process. Raters’ bias in
performance appraisal is considered a severe problem in practice. According to Brian Davis,
executive vice president of Personnel Decisions International,“[t]he problem with rater-bias
is that it takes away the organization’s ability to objectively use data from performance
evaluations with any validity. [...] [Y]ou can’t count on the objectivity or accuracy of a per-
formance assessment, and you have no diﬀerentiating data that allows you to make conﬁdent
decisions about promotions, training, or leadership development.”6 In consequence, with
bad promotion decisions having dire consequences, the biggest of which are lower employee
morale, decreased productivity, and lost customer share, organizations have a vested interest
in identifying the right person for a job because the cost of getting it wrong is high.7
In this paper we argue that organizational design provides a tool which is capable of
thwarting conﬁrmation bias not only in performance appraisal but also in other situations:
4 The horns-and-halo eﬀect, in turn, is one possible explanation for the so-called Matthew eﬀect, which
suggests that no matter how hard an employee strives, their past appraisal records will prejudice their
future attempts to improve. For more on this, see http://www.performance-appraisal.com/bias.htm.
5For papers emphasizing this point, see, for example, Prendergast (1999) and MacLeod (2003).
6See http://www.management-issues.com/2007/6/7/research/bias-blights-performance-reviews.asp. Fur-
ther information about Personnel Decisions International (PDI), a Minneapolis-based consultancy ﬁrm,
can be found at http://www.personneldecisions.com/.
7According to a survey of 444 organizations throughout North America conducted by Right Management,
a globally operating career transition and organizational consulting ﬁrm, the average cost of coping
with an employee who does not work out is 2.5 times his salary. According to Rick Smith, Senior Vice
President of Right Management, “[t]here is a smaller margin for error today in selection and promoting
people into key positions, and a greater need to target development eﬀorts to ensure that they really
make a diﬀerence.” For the corresponding press release from 04/11/2006, see http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=65255&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=849080&highlight=.
4job rotation.8 Under conﬁrmation bias the outcome of a judgment process often is determined
by early pieces of evidence which color all subsequently received pieces of information, i.e.,
ﬁrst impressions matter. By its very nature, in many situations job rotation creates“multiple
ﬁrst impressions” – and thus unbiased evaluations – by regularly breaking up the matches
of the judging person and the situation to be judged. The work practice of job rotation,
however, commonly is acknowledged to be associated with some sort of cost, e.g. a serious
loss of productivity caused by a disruption of work ﬂows or the sacriﬁce of job-speciﬁc human
capital. We show that, when organizational members are subject to conﬁrmation bias,
incuring this cost for implementing job rotation may well be worthwhile for an organization
in order to obtain a more accurate probability assessment upon which to base its decisions.
In Section 2, we brieﬂy review some of the many forms that conﬁrmation bias can take,
survey some (mostly psychological) evidence for these phenomena, and ﬁnally present the
model of conﬁrmation bias proposed by Rabin and Schrag (1999), which we are going to
apply throughout the paper.
Inspired by the anecdotal evidence presented above, in Section 3 we turn to the most
immediate situation one can think of when pondering where conﬁrmation bias might take
eﬀect in organizations: promotion decisions based on the evaluation of workers by their
supervisors. We present a simple model in which, with diﬀerent types of jobs being available,
the eﬃcient allocation of a worker depends on his ability, which is assumed to be commonly
unknown. If the ﬁrm wants to base these decisions on a more solid informational footing
by gathering additional information, due to an exogenously given need to delegate some
tasks, it has to rely on supervisors to do so. Since under the assumptions we impose no
8Job rotation refers to a job practice which assigns an employee not to a single speciﬁc task but to a set
of several tasks (associated with a meaningful change in job content) among which he rotates with some
frequency. For evidence on job rotation being used by a signiﬁcant and increasing number of companies
in the United States and other OECD countries, see Osterman (1994, 2000), Gittleman et al. (1998),
and OECD (1999).
5incentive-compatibility or truthful-revelation complications arise, supervisors are happy to
truthfully report their observations to the ﬁrm. The only friction that we allow for is that
supervisors are subject to conﬁrmation bias. The ﬁrm can choose between two types of work
design, specialization or job rotation. If the ﬁrm opts for specializing the worker, he remains
in one and the same division which leads to an increase in his productivity in this ﬁeld of
activity. Under specialization, however, the worker is evaluated by this division’s supervisor
exclusively. When supervisors succumb to conﬁrmation bias, this leads to later evaluations
being biased due to earlier established beliefs. If the ﬁrm decides to implement job rotation,
on the other hand, the worker is placed in various of the ﬁrm’s divisions and becomes a
generalist who is less productive than a specialist. Under job rotation, however, the ﬁrm
regularly breaks up the matches of supervisors and their subordinates, thereby creating
multiple unbiased evaluations of many supervisors regarding one particular employee. We
show that preventing conﬁrmation bias from aﬀecting supervisors’ judgment can indeed
outweigh the loss of productivity due to implementing job rotation. Moreover, we show that
job rotation is more likely to be the optimal form of work design the stronger the degree of
supervisors’ conﬁrmation bias is.
After discussing our modeling assumptions in Section 4, in Section 5 we provide an al-
ternative interpretation of our model in order to emphasize its applicability to situations
diﬀerent from supervisor-worker relationships. We consider an employee who has to evaluate
where a productive asset might be put to use most proﬁtably. In contrast to the supervisor-
worker setting, here job rotation does not sever the link between the judging person and
the situation to be judged. In consequence an unbiased evaluation in this case probably is
not to be obtained. Nevertheless, empirical evidence documents that preferential treatment
of information supporting existing beliefs as well as overconﬁdence in one’s own judgment
can be reduced by forcing people to evaluate their own views, especially when that includes
providing reasons against their current opinion.9 By placing them in various positions, by
9See Perkins et al. (1991), Fischhoﬀ (1977), Hoch (1984, 1985), Koriat et al. (1980), Tetlock and Kim
6its very nature job rotation forces employees to look at their ﬁeld of activity from diﬀerent
perspectives, thereby most likely broadening their view and making them less susceptible for
one-sided treatment of evidence. By showing that there is scope for the ﬁrm to beneﬁt from
the resulting more reliable probability assessment even when conﬁrmation bias is merely
reduced but not fully eliminated, we provide an explanation for the often found statement
that ﬁrms prefer “well-rounded employees”, which neither relies on the folk wisdom that fu-
ture managers should be equipped with a broad view of the entire ﬁrm, nor on the need of
multi-skilled workers in order to cope eﬃciently with technological change.10
Section 6 concludes by brieﬂy summarizing our results, relating our ﬁndings to alternative
theories of job rotation, and drawing out potential implications for empirical analysis.
Related Literature When it comes to naming potential costs of implementing job rotation,
there almost seems to be unanimity in the theoretical literature: Transferring individuals to
new jobs sacriﬁces job-speciﬁc human capital, and frequent job rotation may in consequence
entail a serious loss of productivity. With regard to beneﬁts of this particular kind of work
design, on the other hand, over the years many explanations have been put forth why it may
be worthwhile to incur the afore-mentioned loss in productivity. One of these explanations,
formalized in Cosgel and Miceli (1999), posits that workers dislike monotonous jobs. In
consequence, regular job transfers increase employees’ motivation and overall satisfaction
by reducing their boredom and keeping them interested in their jobs, which in turn allows
ﬁrms to economize on wages. A large part of the theoretical literature, however, focuses
on the eﬀects of job rotation on ﬁrm learning by placing ﬁrms and their employees on very
unequal informational footing, with the ﬁrm being in a disadvantageous position. In a
framework where the ﬁrm can neither observe workers’ eﬀort nor the productivity of the
jobs the workers are placed in (which subsequently is observed by the respective workers),
(1987).
10See, for example, Schaeﬀer (1983) and Koike (1993) on the former argument, and Carmichael and MacLeod
(1993) on the latter.
7both Ickes and Samuelson (1987) and Arya and Mittendorf (2004) show that job transfers
alleviate the ratchet eﬀect.11 12 Abstracting from any moral hazard problems, Ortega (2001)
ﬁnds that a ﬁrm can beneﬁt from implementing job rotation in order to optimally match
employees to jobs when there is uncertainty about both the proﬁtability of diﬀerent jobs and
the productivity of diﬀerent persons at diﬀerent jobs. Eguchi (2005) considers a multi-task
situation where, next to regular work activities, the worker can engage in inﬂuence activities
which become more proﬁtable for the worker the longer he is in his current position. It
is shown that when the ﬁrm is harmed by this rent-seeking behavior of its employees but
cannot use incentive payment schemes eﬀectively due to diﬃculties in measuring workers’
performance, frequent job transfers are useful to limit these inﬂuence activities. Finally,
when the ﬁrm faces workers of diﬀerent but unobservable ability, Arya and Mittendorf (2006)
argue that implementing optional job rotation programs can help ﬁrms to better match pay
to an employee’s true worth by achieving a self-selection of the workers: When undertaking
diﬀerent tasks is costly for workers but less costly for highly talented employees than for
employees of low talent, the former opt for the job transfer program in order to prove their
versatility, whereas the latter refrain from doing so because it is too costly.
We see this paper as complementing the existing theoretical literature on job rotation in
the following sense: We abstract from any hidden action problems (e.g. hidden gaming by
supervisors or shirking and inﬂuence abilities by workers) and we also remove any infor-
mational disadvantage in the afore-mentioned sense, which organizational members might
proﬁtably exploit (e.g. private information of workers with respect to their own ability or
workplace productivity). Moreover, the preferences of the organizational members are com-
11 The ratchet eﬀect refers to workers’ shirking in order to disguise the productivity of their jobs and to
prevent an increase in performance standards.
12Arguing that under the tie-breaking rule used by Ickes and Samuleson (1987) there exists a second equilib-
rium in which both agents shirk in the productive job and thus are overall better oﬀ, Ma (1988) proposes
an alternative compensation mechanism which uniquely implements the second-best identiﬁed by Ickes
and Samuleson.
8pletely standard with no inherent taste for diversity in their ﬁeld of activity. The only friction
that we allow for is that organizational members are subject to conﬁrmation bias. We show
that – even in the absence of any informational asymmetries – the ﬁrm may beneﬁt from
incuring the cost for implementing job rotation in order to obtain a more accurate probabil-
ity assessment upon which to base its decisions. This observation adds a new item, which is
based upon psychological foundations, to the list of beneﬁts associated with job rotation as
work design.
2 Conﬁrmation Bias
Empirical Evidence Conﬁrmation bias, which refers to unwitting selectivity in both the
acquisition and evaluation of evidence, comes along in many guises. When seeking or inter-
preting information, people display the tendency to give greater weight to evidence that is
supportive to beliefs they hold dear than to information that is counter indicative of those
established opinions. Empirical evidence for this preferential treatment of evidence, also
referred to as my-side bias, is provided by Baron (1991, 1995), Perkins et al. (1983), Perkins
et al. (1991), and Kuhn (1989).13 Another well-documented phenomenon is the primacy
eﬀect, which refers to the ﬁnding that when information is gathered and integrated over
time, evidence acquired in the early stages is likely to carry more weight than evidence ac-
quired later in the process. In consequence, opinions are formed early in the process and
subsequently acquired information evaluated in a way that is partial to that opinion.14 The
primacy eﬀect, which can be seen as possible manifestation of belief persistence,15 can also
13Even if there is no “my side”, i.e., even when people have no vested interest in the truth of a particular
hypothesis, they appear to seek conﬁrmatory information regarding this hypothesis. See, for example,
Maynatt et al. (1977), Schwartz (1982), Zuckerman et al. (1995).
14See, for example, Nisbett and Ross (1980), Lingle and Ostrom (1981), Sherman et al. (1983).
15Belief persistence refers to the resistance of once established opinions to change even when faced with
compelling disconforming evidence. See, for example, Ross et al. (1975), Ross (1977), Ross and Lepper
(1980).
9lead to a biased evaluation and interpretation of evidence that is subsequently acquired:
people tend to question conﬂicting information more willingly than information supportive
of preexisting beliefs (Ross and Anderson, 1982), to see ambiguous evidence more likely as
supporting rather than disconﬁrming an established opinion (Lord et al., 1979; Darley and
Gross, 1983), to explain away events that are inconsistent with a held position (Henrion and
Fischhoﬀ, 1986), and even to interpret evidence that should count against a hypothesis as
counting in favor of it (Pitz et al., 1967).
The explanations that have been put forth to account for conﬁrmation bias are numerous,
ranging from “the desire to believe” over pragmatism and error avoidance to educational
eﬀects. At this point, however, we take the occurrence of this phenomenon as given.
A Formal Model In order to formally draw out the implications of conﬁrmation bias for
organizational design, we adopt the model of conﬁrmation bias and belief formation proposed
by Rabin and Schrag (1999). There are two exhaustive and mutually exclusive states of the
world, θ ∈ {θL θH}. A priori, an individual considers both states of the world equiprobable,
i.e., prob(θ = θL) = prob(θ = θH) = 0 5. In every period t ∈ {1 2 3    } the person receives
a signal, st ∈ {L H}, that is correlated with the true state of the world. Signals received over
time are independently and identically distributed with prob(st = L|θ = θL) = prob(st =
H|θ = θH) =  , for some   ∈ (0 5 1). After receiving each signal, the individual updates
her belief about the relative likelihood of θ = θL and θ = θH.
When subject to conﬁrmation bias, the person may misinterpret signals that contradict her
currently held belief about which state of the world is more likely. Formally, in each period
t ∈ {1 2 3    } the individual perceives a signal σt ∈ {h l}. When the person perceives
signal σt = l she believes that she actually received signal st = L, and if she perceives signal
σt = h she believes that she actually received signal st = H. Given her (possibly erroneous)
perception of the information she is receiving, the individual each period updates her beliefs
according to Bayes’ Rule. With probability q ∈ (0 1) the individual misreads a signal st
10that conﬂicts with her current belief about the true state of the world, which is based on
the sequence of perceived signals σt−1 = (σ1     σt−1). Signals that are supportive of the
currently held belief, on the other hand, are always interpreted correctly. So, for example,
if the person currently believes that θH is more likely, then with certainty she interprets a
signal st = H as σt = h, but with probability q she misinterprets a signal st = L as σt = h.
In order to summarize the distribution of a person’s perceived signal σt more concisely, let
 ∗(q) denote the probability that the person perceives a signal conﬁrming her belief that one
state is more likely when in fact the other state is the true state of the world. Analogously,
let  ∗∗(q) denote the probability that the person perceives a signal conﬁrming her belief that
one state is more likely when in fact it is the true state of the world. Formally,
 
∗(q) = prob(σt = h|prob(θ = θH|σ
t−1) > 0 5  θ = θL)
= prob(σt = l |prob(θ = θL |σ
t−1) > 0 5  θ = θH)
= (1 −  ) + q 
and
 
∗∗(q) = prob(σt = h|prob(θ = θH|σ
t−1) > 0 5  θ = θH)
= prob(σt = l |prob(θ = θL |σ
t−1) > 0 5  θ = θL)
=   + q(1 −  ) 
Note that  ∗∗(q) >  ∗(q) for all q ∈ (0 1) and   ∈ (0 5 1).
3 Supervision and Job Allocation
Suppose a ﬁrm hires a worker who has two periods of active work life. Both the ﬁrm and
the worker are assumed to be risk neutral. The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize overall
output over the two periods. The worker’s ability is either high or low, θ ∈ {θL θH} with
θH > 0. In the ﬁrst period, neither the ﬁrm nor the worker know the worker’s ability. It is
11common knowledge, however, that both types of workers are equally likely among the overall
population, prob(θ = θH) = 0 5.
The ﬁrm comprises of two divisions. At the outset, the ﬁrm commits to one of two possible
types of job design, specialization or job rotation. If the ﬁrm opts for specialization of the
new worker, he is placed in one of these divisions and stays there for at least the ﬁrst period.
If the ﬁrm implements job rotation, the worker spends the ﬁrst half of the ﬁrst period in one
division and the second half of the ﬁrst period in the other division. Thus, under job rotation
the worker becomes a generalist in the sense that he learns as much about one division as
he learns about the other. Let r ∈ {1 2} denote the number of divisions that the worker is
placed in during the ﬁrst period, i.e., r = 1 corresponds to specialization and r = 2 to job
rotation.16
We abstract from any moral hazard problems: presence of the worker is enough for the ﬁrm
to beneﬁt from his input, i.e., no costly eﬀort from the worker is needed. In his ﬁrst period
with the ﬁrm, the worker has to be trained and has to learn work ﬂows, organizational design,
and communication channels. Since each new worker faces these basic tasks regardless of his
talent or his work place, ﬁrst-period output is assumed to be independent of both his ability
and the division he is placed in. Moreover, ﬁrst-period output is independent of the type of
work design, job rotation or specialization. We normalize ﬁrst-period output to zero. The
worker’s second-period output, on the other hand, depends on both his ability and the type
of job he is allocated to in the following way: There are two types of jobs for the worker,
j ∈ {A B}, that the ﬁrm can install in the second period in any division the worker visited
during the ﬁrst period. Let yj denote the worker’s second-period output in job j. Output
in job A is independent of the worker’s ability, yA = ¯ y > 0. In job B, on the other hand,
16The assumption that the worker switches divisions only once under job rotation is shared with most
contributions to the extant theoretical literature on job rotation, e.g. Ickes and Samuelson (1987), Cosgel
and Miceli (1999), Ortega (2001), and Arya and Mittendorf (2004).





¯ y + k(r)θH for θ = θH
0 for θ = θL
 
where 0 < k(2) < k(1) = 1. More vividly spoken, job A might be thought of as a back-
oﬃce job where the worker has to do (possibly tedious but nevertheless straightforward)
paperwork. Job B, on the other hand, could be that of a product designer or marketing
manager, where skills like creativity or analytical thinking are important for success. With
the impact of high talent on output being decreasing in the degree of rotation, 1 − k(2)
represents the beneﬁts of specialization. Let θH < ¯ y, which implies that the ﬁrm would
place the worker in job A even under specialization if it had to rely on its prior beliefs when
allocating the worker to a job in period 2.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that once the worker starts working for the ﬁrm,
he stays with that ﬁrm for both periods. Thus, all the ﬁrm has to do is to compensate the
worker for his (discounted lifetime) reservation utility, which we assume to be zero.
Under these assumptions the only remaining decision the ﬁrm has to take is in what type
of job to place the worker at the beginning of period 2. With θH ∈ (0  ¯ y), in order to allow
for a meaningful analysis, the ﬁrm must be able to gather information about the worker’s
ability. Due to some exogenously given need for delegation, the ﬁrm itself cannot observe
this information about the worker’s ability, but has to rely on the divisions’ supervisors for
doing so. We assume that over his ﬁrst period with the ﬁrm, there are two evaluation periods
of equal length in each of which the worker is evaluated by the supervisor of the division in
which he is currently placed.17 Under specialization the worker is evaluated twice in one and
the same division by this division’s supervisor, whereas under job rotation he is evaluated
exactly once in each division he is placed in and thus by two diﬀerent supervisors. In each
evaluation period, the current supervisor of the worker receives a signal st ∈ {L H}, t = 1 2,
17The (admittedly) ad hoc restriction to only two evaluation periods will be discussed at length in the
following section.
13about the worker’s ability. This signal represents, for example, the realization of some set of
(at least to some extent) subjective performance measures. Let   = prob(st = H|θ = θH) =
prob(st = L|θ = θL) ∈ (0 5 1).
Supervisors are risk neutral and we abstract from any incentives for supervisors to lie
about the signals they perceive, e.g. disutility from handing out bad evaluations. Moreover,
we assume that supervisors costlessly observe signals and that the informativeness of the
signals is independent of any costly eﬀort of the supervisors. Under these assumptions,
an arbitrarily small incentive to identify the true ability of the worker, e.g. an arbitrarily
small stake in the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, will lead to the supervisors reporting truthfully. The only
friction we allow for is that supervisors are subject to conﬁrmation bias. As described
in the previous section, with probability q ∈ (0 1) a supervisor misinterprets signals that
contradict her current hypothesis about the worker’s ability as supporting her hypothesis.
Let the supervisor’s perception of signal st ∈ {L H} be denoted by σt ∈ {l h}. We assume
that all supervisors share the same (common knowledge) prior about the worker being of
high talent, prob(θ = θH) = 0 5, and that there is no communication among supervisors. In
consequence, conﬁrmation bias will only aﬀect a supervisor’s judgment under specialization
when she receives subsequent signals about the same worker. Last, we assume that the ﬁrm
is aware of the supervisors being subject to conﬁrmation bias. If this was not the case, there
would be no reason for the ﬁrm to implement anything else but specialization.
With regard to information transmission, at the end of each evaluation period, a su-
pervisor reports her perceived signal immediately to the ﬁrm, where this information is
stored. Thus, at the end of period 1, the ﬁrm is faced with a tuple of reports, (σ1 σ2) ∈
{(h h) (h l) (l h) (l l)} ≡ M. We assume that both the content and the date of reception
of these reports are veriﬁable, and that in consequence, when choosing the type of job design
at the outset, the ﬁrm can commit to an allocation rule based on the content and the order
of the supervisors’ reports.18 For a given job design which places the worker in r ∈ {1 2}
18This assumption allows us to sidestep the issue whether the ﬁrm itself is subject to conﬁrmation bias. We
14divisions during the ﬁrst period, this allocation rule Br prescribes for which pairs of reports
the worker is allocated to job B. Formally, either Br ⊆ M or Br = ∅, where the latter refers
to the worker being allocated to job A no matter what.19 Clearly, the optimal allocation
rule depends on the updated posterior belief of the worker being of high talent, which in
turn depends on the type of job design implemented. The timing of events is summarized in
Figure 1.
In a ﬁrst-best situation, i.e., when the worker’s ability is known to the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm would
place the worker in job A when θ = θL and in job B when θ = θH, where in the latter case
the worker stays in one and the same division over the ﬁrst period in order to capitalize on
the beneﬁts of specialization. When the worker’s talent is unknown to the ﬁrm, it has to
rely on the reports of the supervisors when allocating the worker to a job in period 2.
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
Firm commits to Supervisor Supervisor Allocation of the worker
job design r ∈ {1  2} receives s1 receives s2 to job j ∈ {A  B},
and allocation rule Br. and reports σ1. and reports σ2. realization of yj.
Figure 1: Timing of events.
Allocation under Specialization First, suppose the ﬁrm decides to reap the beneﬁts of
specialization and does not implement job rotation. Under specialization, after two evalua-
tion periods the worker will be allocated to job B if and only if, given the updated posterior
belief that the worker is highly talented, the expected output in job B exceeds the ability-
will comment on this assumption in the next section.
19More precisely, an allocation rule for a job design with r ∈ {1 2} is a mapping Br : M → {A B}, which
prescribes for each pair of possible reports (σ1 σ2) ∈ M in which job the worker is placed in period 2.
The above “operationalization” of such an allocation rule, however, will turn out to be quite convenient.
15independent output in job A, or equivalently, if and only if the ﬁrm’s posterior belief about
the worker being of high talent exceeds
¯ p :=
¯ y
¯ y + θH
 
Note that ¯ p ∈ (0 5 1) due to our assumptions that θH ∈ (0  ¯ y). With supervisors being
subject to conﬁrmation bias, if a supervisor receives in the second evaluation period a signal
which contradicts her current opinion about the worker’s ability, with probability q ∈ (0 1)
she misinterprets that signal as supporting her current opinion. When forming its updated
posterior belief based on the supervisor’s report at the end of the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm has
to take into account the supervisor’s possible misperception of the signals she received. In
consequence, the order in which signals are received, or more precisely perceived, is impor-
tant. Suppose, for example, the supervisor reports that she has observed two h signals. The
ﬁrm now has to take into account that the supervisor, after having received an H signal in
the ﬁrst evaluation period, at the beginning of the second evaluation period considered the
agent more likely to be of high ability than of low ability. Therefore, since with probability
q she misinterprets an L signal as supporting her opinion, the probability that the super-
visor perceived a second h signal is higher than the probability that she actually received
a second H signal.20 Let p(σ1 σ2;q) := Prob(θ = θH|σ1 σ2;q) denote the ﬁrm’s posterior
believe about the worker being of high ability after the supervisor reports (σ1 σ2) ∈ M
under specialization. Then, according to Bayes’ rule,
p(h h;q) =
  ∗∗(q)
  ∗∗(q) + (1 −  ) ∗(q)
 
Analogously we obtain p(h l;q) = p(l h;q) = 0 5, and p(l l;q) = (1− ) ∗(q) [(1− ) ∗(q)+
  ∗∗(q)]. It is readily veriﬁed that   > 0 5 implies p(l l;q) < 0 5 < p(h h;q) for all q ∈ (0 1).
From above we know that the ﬁrm will allocate the worker to job B only if the ex post belief
20While the probability of receiving a second H signal when θ = θH is  , the probability that the supervisor
perceives a second h signal is  ∗∗(q) >  . Analogously, while the probability of receiving a second H
signal when θ = θL is 1− , the probability that the supervisor perceives a second h signal is  ∗(q) > 1− .
16about the worker being of high ability exceeds ¯ p > 0 5. Thus, under specialization, the
worker will be placed in job B only if the supervisor reports two h signals and p(h h;q) ≥ ¯ p.
Lemma 1: If p(h h;q) ≥ ¯ p, then B1 = {(h h)}. Otherwise, B1 = ∅.
Allocation under Job Rotation Under our assumptions on intra-organizational informa-
tion transmission, job rotation helps the ﬁrm to get rid of the supervisors’ conﬁrmation bias.
Each evaluation period the worker is evaluated by a diﬀerent supervisor, and each of these su-
pervisors shares the common prior about the worker’s ability since she encounters the worker
for the ﬁrst time. Thus, job rotation creates multiple unbiased “ﬁrst impressions”, which in
turn allows the ﬁrm to derive a more accurate probability assessment about the worker’s
talent. Clearly, in this situation the order in which signals are observed is of no importance
for the updated posterior belief. Formally, let p(nh nl) = Prob(θ = θH|nh nl) denote the
ﬁrm’s updated posterior belief about the agent being highly talented, where nh and nl are
the overall number of h signals and l signals, respectively, reported by the supervisors over
the two evaluation periods. According to Bayes’ rule we have
p(2 0) =
 2
 2 + (1 −  )2 
Analogously, we obtain p(0 2) = (1 −  )2 [ 2 + (1 −  )2] and p(1 1) = 0 5. Since   > 1 2,
we have p(0 2) < 0 5 < p(2 0). Removing the distortion due to conﬁrmation bias, however,
comes at the cost of sacriﬁcing the beneﬁts of specialization since k(2) < 1. Under job
rotation, the worker will be placed in job B only if the posterior belief about the worker
being of high talent exceeds
¯ ¯ p :=
¯ y
¯ y + k(2)θH
 
Since k(2) ∈ (0 1), we have 0 5 < ¯ p < ¯ ¯ p < 1. Thus, under job rotation, the worker will be
allocated to job B if and only if two h signals have been reported and p(2 0) ≥ ¯ ¯ p.
Lemma 2: If p(2 0) ≥ ¯ ¯ p, then B2 = {(h h)}. Otherwise, B2 = ∅.
17Comparison of Job Designs The question of interest is whether job allocation under job
rotation can outperform job allocation under specialization in terms of ex-ante expected
output. So far we know that the allocation rule under specialization depends on whether
or not p(h h;q) exceeds ¯ p, whereas under job rotation it depends on whether or not p(2 0)
exceeds ¯ ¯ p. Since   > 0 5 and q > 0, we have p(h h;q) < p(2 0), which reﬂects that the
ﬁrm is more conﬁdent that the worker is highly talented after two h signals being reported
under job rotation than under specialization due to a more accurate probability assessment.
With k(2) < k(1) = 1, on the other hand, we have ¯ p < ¯ ¯ p, which accounts for the loss of
productivity under job rotation. Thus, we have to distinguish the following cases:
(a) ¯ p ≤ p(h h;q) and ¯ ¯ p ≤ p(2 0);
(b) ¯ p ≤ p(h h;q) and p(2 0) < ¯ ¯ p;
(c) p(h h;q) < ¯ p and ¯ ¯ p ≤ p(2 0);
(d) p(h h;q) < ¯ p and p(2 0) < ¯ ¯ p.
Obviously, case (d) is of little interest since under both forms of job design the worker will
always be allocated to job A, B1 = B2 = ∅, which yields output ¯ y with certainty. In case (a),
the allocation rule is identical under both types of job design, since the worker is allocated to
job B whenever two h signals are reported, and to job A otherwise, B1 = B2 = {(h h)}; ex-
ante expected output, however, may diﬀer under both types of job design due to a diﬀerent
probability assessment on the one hand, and the beneﬁt of specialization on the other hand.
Cases (b) and (c) obviously give rise to diﬀerent allocation rules: In case (b), while the
worker is always placed in job A under job rotation, B2 = ∅, he is allocated to job B if two
h signals are reported under specialization, B1 = {(h h)}. In case (c), allocation rules are
vice versa.
18In order to compare job designs in cases (a)-(c), we ﬁrst characterize these cases in terms
of the underlying model parameters   and k(2) for given values ¯ y, θH and q ∈ (0 1).21 It is
readily veriﬁed that p(2 0) ≥ ¯ ¯ p if and only if k(2) ≥ ¯ k, where
¯ k :=





Since k(2) < 1, for k(2) ≥ ¯ k to be possible we must have ¯ k < 1. Regarding ¯ k as a function
of  , we ﬁnd that ¯ k < 1 if and only if   > ¯  , where








By the assumption that θH ∈ (0  ¯ y) we have ¯   ∈ (0 5 1). Next, note that p(h h;q) < ¯ p if
and only if   < ¯ ¯  (q), where
¯ ¯  (q) :=
2¯ y − q(¯ y − θH) −
 
q2(¯ y − θH)2 + 4¯ yθH
2(1 − q)(¯ y − θH)
 
In the appendix we show that limq→0 ¯ ¯  (q) = ¯   and that, for all q ∈ (0 1), d¯ ¯  (q) dq > 0 and
¯ ¯  (q) < 1, which implies that ¯ ¯  (q) ∈ (¯   1) for q ∈ (0 1). The fact that ¯ ¯  (q) is increasing in q
reﬂects that if the distortion through conﬁrmation bias becomes stronger, for the ﬁrm to be
willing to allocate the worker to the ability-dependent job B under specialization the signal
itself must become more reliable. Taken together, these observations allow us to establish
the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Given ¯ y, θH, and q ∈ (0 1), we have
(a) ¯ p ≤ p(h h;q), ¯ ¯ p ≤ p(2 0) iﬀ   ∈ [¯ ¯  (q) 1) and k(2) ≥ ¯ k;
(b) ¯ p ≤ p(h h;q) < p(2 0) < ¯ ¯ p iﬀ   ∈ [¯ ¯  (q) 1) and k(2) < ¯ k;
(c) p(h h;q) < ¯ p < ¯ ¯ p ≤ p(2 0) iﬀ   ∈ (¯    ¯ ¯  (q)) and k(2) ≥ ¯ k.
Proof: See Appendix.
21For details, see the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
19Note that   has to be suﬃciently large (  > ¯  ) to allow for the possibility of job rotation
being the optimal choice of work design. Intuitively, if the correlation of the (unbiased) signal
with the true state of the world is too low per se, it does not pay oﬀ for the ﬁrm to incur
the cost of job rotation in order to prevent this bad signal from becoming somewhat more
distorted.
To compare job rotation and specialization in terms of ex-ante expected output, we in-
troduce one further piece of notation. Let P(r) denote the probability of two h signals
being reported when the number of divisions the worker is placed in equals r. Then
P(1) = (1 2)(  ∗∗(q) + (1 −  ) ∗(q)) and P(2) = (1 2)( 2 + (1 −  )2). Moreover, let
E[y|r] denote the ex-ante expected output under a job design with r ∈ {1 2}.
Case (a): Under both specialization and job rotation the same allocation rule is imple-
mented, B1 = B2 = {(h h)}. Thus, E[y|2] > E[y|1] if and only if
P(2)p(2 0)(¯ y + k(2)θH) + (1 − P(2))¯ y > P(1)p(h h;q)(¯ y + θH) + (1 − P(1))¯ y 
or equivalently, if and only if k(2) > ¯ ¯ k(q), where
¯ ¯ k(q) := 1 −









First, note that ¯ ¯ k(q) < 1 for all q ∈ (0 1). Moreover, it is readily veriﬁed that ¯ ¯ k(q) ≥ ¯ k if
and only if   ≥ ¯ ¯  (q). Thus, in case (a), we have 0 < ¯ k ≤ ¯ ¯ k(q) < 1.
Case (b): While the allocation rule under job rotation is B2 = ∅, under specialization we
have B1 = {(h h)}. Thus, E[y|2] ≤ E[y|1] if and only if
¯ y ≤ P(1)p(h h;q)(¯ y + θH) + (1 − P(1))¯ y 
or equivalently, if and only if   ≥ ¯ ¯  (q). Since this last inequality is satisﬁed in case (b),
specialization unconditionally outperforms job rotation. This result follows more immedi-
ately from the fact that under specialization the ﬁrm prefers to implement allocation rule
B1 = {(h h)} instead of B1 = ∅.
20Case (c): Under specialization the allocation rule is B1 = ∅, whereas under job rotation
we have B2 = {(h h)}. Thus, E[y|2] > E[y|1] if and only if
P(2)p(2 0)(¯ y + k(2)θH) + (1 − P(2))¯ y > ¯ y 
or equivalently, if and only if k(2) > ¯ k. Since this last inequality is satisﬁed in case (c), job
rotation unconditionally outperforms specialization. This result follows more immediately
from the fact that under job rotation the ﬁrm prefers to implement allocation rule B2 =
{(h h)} instead of B2 = ∅.
We summarize the above observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Given ¯ y, θH, q ∈ (0 1), job rotation strictly outperforms specialization,
E[y|2] > E[y|1], if and only if (i)   ∈ [¯ ¯  (q) 1) and k(2) > ¯ ¯ k(q), or (ii)   ∈ (¯    ¯ ¯  (q)) and
k(2) > ¯ k.
Thus, given that the beneﬁts of specialization are suﬃciently small, there are two rea-
sons for job rotation being superior compared to specialization. First, in case (c), there
are diﬀerent allocation rules implemented under the diﬀerent types of job design. Under
specialization, conﬁrmation bias is so strong that the worker will always be placed in the
ability-independent job A because the ﬁrm is (justiﬁedly) pessimistic – even if two h signals
are reported – about the worker’s talent.22 Under job rotation, in contrast, with an unbiased
probability assessment, the ﬁrm dares to place the worker in job B when two h signals are
reported, which ex ante generates higher expected proﬁts. Secondly, in case (a), both types
of job design nominally implement the same allocation rule, i.e., the worker is allocated to
job B if two h signals are reported and to job A otherwise. Under job rotation, however,
due to unbiased reports, the probability of actually facing a highly-talented worker is higher
than under specialization, which, again, leads to ex ante higher expected proﬁts.
Having characterized the circumstances where job rotation outperforms specialization and
vice versa, allows us to establish the following comparative static result.
22Formally, given ¯ y, θH, and  , q is suﬃciently large such that   < ¯ ¯  (q), and in turn, p(h h;q) < ¯ p.
21Proposition 2: Given ¯ y, θH,  , and q such that   ∈ [¯ ¯  (q) 1) and k(2) ∈ [¯ k ¯ ¯ k(q)]. An
increase in the degree of conﬁrmation bias from q to q′ > q makes it more likely that job
rotation strictly outperforms specialization.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. In the original situation, a subcase of case
(a) in Lemma 3, under both types of job design the worker is allocated to job B if two h
signals are reported and to job A otherwise. According to Proposition 1, however, special-
ization outperforms job rotation in terms of ex ante expected output because the beneﬁts
of specialization are large. Under specialization, an increase in the degree of conﬁrmation
bias, q, reduces the posterior belief about the worker being highly talented after two h sig-
nals have been reported. The posterior belief under job rotation, in contrast, is unaﬀected
by an increase in q. There are two reasons why this might lead to job rotation becoming
the optimal form of job design. First, if the posterior belief under specialization is lowered
suﬃciently, the ﬁrm will adopt a diﬀerent allocation rule under specialization and place the
worker in job A no matter what, in which case job rotation unconditionally becomes supe-
rior. Formally, the increase in q raises ¯ ¯  (q). Letting q < q′, if ¯ ¯  (q) ≤   < ¯ ¯  (q′), then the
shift from q to q′ leads to a transition from case (a) to case (c) in Lemma 3. Secondly, even
if the ﬁrm sticks to the original allocation rule, since the reliability of the supervisor’s report
decreases under specialization, the threshold which the cost of implementing job rotation
must not exceed in order for job rotation to be optimal, becomes less stringent, ¯ ¯ k(q′) < ¯ ¯ k(q).
If ¯ ¯ k(q′) < k(2) ≤ ¯ ¯ k(q), job rotation becomes the optimal form of job design. Thus, when
conﬁrmation bias becomes a more severe problem, the stronger distortion of the supervisor’s
reports under specialization is more likely to outweigh the loss in productivity that comes
along with job rotation.
Before we move on to a discussion of our modeling assumptions, we want to relate the above
analysis to a statement found in Ickes and Samuelson (1987). There we read that “ [w]hile
uncertainty about employee productivity may be important, job transfers can optimally arise
only if there is also uncertainty about the productivity of the job. Allowing uncertainty about
22employee characteristics [...] cannot serve as an alternative explanation for job transfers.”
As we have seen, however, when we allow for another type of friction in form of conﬁrmation
bias of supervisors, job rotation may be the optimal form of work design even if there is no
uncertainty regarding job characteristics but only regarding employee characteristics.
4 Discussion
Multiple periods While we stripped our model bare of hidden action and hidden infor-
mation problems on purpose, the restriction to two evaluation periods is not that voluntar-
ily but imposed by Rabin and Schrag (1999)’s model of conﬁrmation bias. To illustrate,
suppose the ﬁrm comprises of three divisions, implements three evaluation periods, and
rotates the worker three times when opting for job rotation. The allocation rule under
specialization depends on how the ﬁrm’s posterior belief compares to ¯ p, whereas the al-
location rule under job rotation depends on how the ﬁrm’s posterior belief compares to
¯ ¯ p = ¯ y (¯ y − k(3)θH), where k(3) < 1 represents the cost of rotating the worker three
times compared to specialization. Under both types of work design, with 0 5 < ¯ p < ¯ ¯ p,
a necessary condition for the worker to be placed in the ability-dependent job B is that
the ﬁrm’s posterior belief about the worker being of high talent exceeds 0 5. Applica-
tion of Bayes’ rule and straightforward calculations reveal that the ﬁrm’s posterior be-
lief exceeds 0 5 if and only if at least two H signals have been reported. More precisely,
p(3 0) > p(h h h;q) > p(2 1) = p(h l h;q) = p(l h h;q) =   > p(h h l;q) > 0 5.
Thus, in order to compare specialization and job rotation in terms of expected output, we
have to distinguish ten diﬀerent cases, as illustrated in Table 1.
While dealing with that many cases clearly would be tedious enough, we run into further
problems when characterizing these cases in terms of the underlying model parameter  . For
example, in order to determine the values of   for which p(h h h;q) < ¯ p, we have to ﬁgure
23B1 B2
p(h  h  h; q) < ¯ p, p(3  0) < ¯ ¯ p ∅ ∅
  < ¯ p ≤ p(h  h  h; q), p(3  0) < ¯ ¯ p {(h  h  h)} ∅
p(h  h  l; q) < ¯ p ≤  , p(3  0) < ¯ ¯ p {(h  l  h)  (l  h  h)  (h  h  h)} ∅
0 5 < ¯ p ≤ p(h  h  l; q), p(3  0) < ¯ ¯ p {(h  h  l)  (h  l  h)  (l  h  h)  (h  h  h)} ∅
p(h  h  h; q) < ¯ p,   < ¯ ¯ p ≤ p(3  0) ∅ {(h  h  h)}
  < ¯ p ≤ p(h  h  h; q),   < ¯ ¯ p ≤ p(3  0) {(h  h  h)} {(h  h  h)}
p(h  h  l; q) < ¯ p ≤  ,   < ¯ ¯ p ≤ p(3  0) {(h  l  h)  (l  h  h)  (h  h  h)} {(h  h  h)}
0 5 < ¯ p ≤ p(h  h  l; q),   < ¯ ¯ p ≤ p(3  0) {(h  h  l)  (h  l  h)  (l  h  h)  (h  h  h)} {(h  h  h)}
p(h  h  l; q) < ¯ p ≤  , 0 5 < ¯ ¯ p ≤   {(h  l  h)  (l  h  h)  (h  h  h)} {(h  h  l)  (h  l  h)  (l  h  h)  (h  h  h)}
0 5 < ¯ p ≤ p(h  h  l; q), 0 5 < ¯ ¯ p ≤   {(h  h  l)  (h  l  h)  (l  h  h)  (h  h  h)} {(h  h  l)  (h  l  h)  (l  h  h)  (h  h  h)}
Table 1: Allocation rules for three evaluation periods.
out when
 (  + q(1 −  ))2
 (  + q(1 −  ))2 + (1 −  )((1 −  ) + q )2 <
¯ y
¯ y − θH
  (1)
which basically boils down to ﬁnding the zeros of a polynomial of third order. With both the
number of cases to consider and the degree of the polynomials characterizing the threshold
levels for   increasing in the number of evaluations, the necessary calculations soon become
infeasible. Thus, in order to inquire into interesting questions of optimal rotation intervals
or the optimal number of evaluation periods a more tractable model of conﬁrmation bias is
needed.
Commitment to an allocation rule The assumption that the ﬁrm can commit to an
allocation rule at the outset can be dropped when the ﬁrm itself is not subject to conﬁrmation
bias when making the allocation decision based on the reports it received. With the ﬁrm’s
perception being unbiased, its updated posterior from report (σ1 σ2) is the same irrespective
of whether it is calculated ex ante, before actually receiving this report, or ex post, i.e., after
24having received (and thus after having evaluated) this report. Therefore, if commitment to
an allocation rule is not possible, after receiving the reports there is no incentive for the
ﬁrm to deviate from the allocation rule which is optimal if commitment is possible before
receiving the reports.23
The assumption that the head of the ﬁrm is not subject to conﬁrmation bias does not seem
that far-fetched. As we already mentioned in Section 2, for conﬁrmation bias to arise, pieces
of evidence have to be received and evaluated subsequently, and there also often needs to be
some degree of vagueness that leaves room for misinterpretation. Both can be imagined not
to be the case for the head of the organization: First, when deciding in which job to place
a worker, the head of the ﬁrm refers to the reports and recommendations of the supervisors
that evaluated this worker. With forced distribution rankings or speciﬁed evaluation schemes
often being used in practice, there probably is less room for arbitrariness in interpretation
of these reports than in the original evaluation of the worker by his supervisor(s). Secondly,
with bosses and CEOs almost always having got their hands full, the head of the ﬁrm will
not spend days over days in advance pondering where to place the worker, but more likely
he will focus on the decision shortly before it is due with most (all) relevant information
available. Though only one evaluation report or memo can be read at a time, for the head
of the ﬁrm this removes the sequential character of information acquisition at least to some
degree. Third, while probably only one supervisor at a time is responsible for evaluation of
the worker, when making the allocation decision, the head of the organization most likely
comprises of several actors, like the personnel manager, the managers in whose division the
worker might be placed in, and so on. One might imagine that preferential treatment of
evidence might be less likely to occur when discussing pros and cons of a decision with
other equally skilled people. Last, the assumption of a rational head of the organization
23The ﬁrm’s updated posterior beliefs ex ante and ex post, however, would not coincide if the ﬁrm also
succumbs to conﬁrmation bias when evaluating the reports it received. In this case, the ability to commit
to an allocation rule clearly makes a diﬀerence.
25also is in line with the largest part of the literature on behavioral industrial organization,
where rational ﬁrms/principals interact with behaviorally biased consumers/agents: while
the former know about the biases of the latter, the latter often are assumed to be naive and
do not know about their own bias.24
5 An Alternative Interpretation
In this section we want to emphasize applicability of the above analysis to situations dif-
ferent from supervisor-worker relationships. In order to do so, we provide an alternative
interpretation of our model. Apart from very few exceptions, we basically just relabel vari-
ables. Therefore, as long as there is no danger of confusion, we will make use of notation
and deﬁnitions introduced before without explicitly saying so.
Suppose a risk neutral ﬁrm, which comprises of several divisions, e.g. production and
marketing, faces two opportunities where to deploy an asset in the second period, project
A or project B. For example, the asset might be a machine used in production, and the
two projects represent the production of diﬀerent products. While the return of project A
is assumed to be riskless, RA = ¯ R > 0, the return of project B depends on the true state of





¯ R + ∆ for θ = θH
0 for θ = θL
 
where ∆ ∈ (0  ¯ R). Thus, in the above example, we can think of project A as the production
of a product which is already established in the market and for which the ﬁrm is familiar with
the production process. Project B, on the other hand, can be thought of as the production of
a newly developed product, the success of which depends on factors like market acceptance
or whether there will be complications in the production process. In this sense, θH can be
24 See, for example, Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), Gilpatric (2008), and
Gabaix and Laibson (2006). For a survey on bounded rationality in industrial organization, see Ellison
(2006).
26interpreted as a situation, i.e., a constellation of market characteristics and technological
circumstances, in which the launch of the new product will be successful, whereas it will be
a failure if the state is θL. A priori, the two states are equally likely. Thus, without any
further information, the ﬁrm allocates the asset to project A.
In order to obtain further information about the true state of the world, the ﬁrm can hire
a risk neutral worker in period 1, who lives and stays with the ﬁrm for two periods. The
worker’s (discounted lifetime) reservation utility equals zero. Once again, we abstract from
hidden information or hidden action problems: there is no uncertainty about the worker’s
talent, and the worker’s output is (for expositional purposes only) equal to zero in both
periods. The only meaningful task the ﬁrm can assign to the worker is to gather informa-
tion about the true state of the world in order to improve the decision where to place the
productive asset.
Over the ﬁrst period, the worker costlessly receives two subsequent signals about the true
state of the world, st ∈ {L H} with t = 1 2. These signals are identically and independently
distributed according to   ∈ (0 5 1). Due to conﬁrmation bias, however, the signal the
worker receives may diﬀer from the signal he actually perceives: once he comes to believe
that one state of the world is more likely than the other, with probability q ∈ (0 1) the
agent misinterprets a signal which contradicts this hypothesis as actually supporting this
hypothesis. Let the worker’s perception of signal st ∈ {L H} be denoted by σt ∈ {l h}.
We assume that the ﬁrm itself does not receive the signals, and therefore has to rely on the
reports of the worker. The ﬁrm, however, is aware of the worker’s conﬁrmation bias. With
the gathering of information being costless and the worker being risk neutral, an arbitrarily
small incentive to identify the true state of the world, e.g. an arbitrarily small stake in the
return of the second-period project, will lead to the worker reporting truthfully what signals
he has perceived. Both the content and the order of these reports, which we can identify
with the worker’s perceived signals (σ1 σ2) ∈ M, are veriﬁable.
At the outset, the ﬁrm can commit to a particular type of job design, specialization or job
27rotation. Letting r ∈ {1 2} denote the number of divisions the worker is placed in during the
ﬁrst period, r = 1 corresponds to specialization and r = 2 to job rotation. If the ﬁrm opts
for implementing job rotation and makes the worker switch divisions during his ﬁrst period
with the ﬁrm, it incurs a cost c > 0.25 Moreover, the ﬁrm can commit to an allocation rule,
which prescribes for which reports of the worker the asset is placed in project B. Thus, for
a job design with r ∈ {1 2}, this allocation rule is either Br = ∅ or Br ⊆ M.
We do not believe it to be too far-fetched to assume that job rotation will reduce con-
ﬁrmation bias in this scenario as well. Suppose the ﬁrm opts for specialization and worker
is placed in the production division throughout his ﬁrst period with the ﬁrm. Though he
might be able to get all the relevant information from the marketing division, it is easy to
imagine that he will see all bits of information he gathers through the eyes of a production
engineer, thus attaching too much weight to technological aspects and too little weight to
market related data.26 If the ﬁrm implements job rotation, on the other hand, during the
ﬁrst period the worker switches from production into marketing, and thus basically is forced
to open his eyes more widely with respect to the market-related data as well. Thus, while
the agent already holds some belief about the true state of the world when being placed in
the marketing division, the new perspective from which he now has to assess the problem
might make him more willing to let go of this hypothesis. However, since one and the same
worker evaluates one and the same problem, it is likely that conﬁrmation bias will merely be
25Basically c > 0 may reﬂect any cost possibly associated with job rotation. Campion et al. (1994), for
example, identify productivity losses and disruption of work ﬂows for both the department gaining a
rotating employee and the department losing the employee as potential costs of job rotation, resulting
from training requirements in the ﬁrst case and from having a vacancy in the second case. Also Burke and
Moore (2000) draw attention to reverberating negative eﬀects of job rotation on nonrotaters’ perception
of organizational justice.
26Evidence for experts being more conﬁdent than justiﬁed when making judgments in their own areas of
expertise is provided by Kidd (1970), Loftus and Wagenaar (1988), Oskamp (1965) regarding engineers,
attorneys, and psychologists, respectively.
28reduced by job rotation but not fully eliminated. Thus, letting qr denote the probability that
the agent misinterprets a contradicting signal under a job design which places the worker in
r ∈ {1 2} divisions during the ﬁrst period, we assume 0 < q2 < q1 < 1.
Deﬁning
¯ c :=
 (1 −  )(q1 − q2)( ¯ R − ∆)
2
and
¯ ¯ c =:
 (  + q2(1 −  ))∆ − (1 −  )((1 −  ) + q2 ) ¯ R
2
 
and following the lines of the analysis in Section 3, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3: Given ¯ R, ∆, q1, q2, job rotation strictly outperforms specialization, E[R|2] >
E[R|1] if and only if (i)   ∈ [¯ ¯  (q1) 1) and c < ¯ c, or (ii)   ∈ (¯ ¯  (q2)  ¯ ¯  (q1)) and c < ¯ ¯ c.
Proof: See Appendix.
The above result is familiar by now: if the beneﬁt of specialization is suﬃciently small,
job rotation may be superior to specialization for two reasons. First, in case (ii), with
conﬁrmation bias being strong under specialization, the ﬁrm implements a very conservative
allocation rule under specialization which places the asset always in project A, whereas
under job rotation the asset is placed in project B if two h signals are reported and in
project A otherwise. This more “daring” allocation rule, which is based on a more reliable
probability assessment, yields higher expected proﬁts. In case (i), on the other hand, even
though allocation rules are identical under both types of work design, under job rotation,
due to unbiased reports, the probability of the worker being of high talent after two h
signals have been reported is higher than under specialization, which yields higher expected
proﬁts. Moreover, if the degree of conﬁrmation bias under specialization increases or job
rotation becomes more eﬃcient in reducing the employees degree of conﬁrmation bias, i.e.,
if q1 increases or q2 decreases, it becomes more likely that job rotation is the optimal form of
29work design. This follows from the fact that the threshold which the cost of implementing
job rotation must not exceed in order for job rotation to be optimal becomes less stringent,
d¯ c q2 = −d¯ c q1 < 0 and d¯ ¯ c dq2 < 0.
As we brieﬂy mentioned in the introduction, the literature on management development
and employee learning recommends job rotation in order to endow the managers-to-be with
a deeper understanding of more aspects of business, which they will need as they move up to
broader jobs, or to help employees to cope better with uncertainty and technological change.
The above analysis suggests, however, that a ﬁrm may have an incentive to provide its em-
ployees with a broader view of the organization even in the absence of such considerations: if
knowledge of diﬀerent organizational aspects makes employees less susceptible to conﬁrma-
tion bias, and if the ﬁrm has to base some of its decisions on its employees’ judgments, job
rotation may help to provide a more profound informational footing for the ﬁrm’s decisions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we examined a setting in which an organization is faced with its members being
subject to conﬁrmation bias, i.e., the tendency to treat subsequent information partially after
an initial position has been taken. Given that job rotation is able (i) to sever the link between
the judge and the situation to be judged, or (ii) to force the judge to be more open-minded
for contradicting evidence, we have shown that implementing this particular form of job
design may be proﬁtable for the organization, even if it comes along with certain costs. The
reason is that job rotation leads to a more reliable informational footing for the organization’s
decision making. We do not, however, obtain a call for a universal mandate for job rotation,
but we ﬁnd that optimality of job rotation is circumstance speciﬁc. In particular, the higher
the degree of conﬁrmation bias and the lower the cost associated with the implementation
of job rotation, the more likely it is that job rotation is superior to specialization.
As brieﬂy mentioned in the introduction, there are three major approaches to explain
why work place organization may take the particular form of job rotation: employee moti-
30vation, employee learning, and employer learning. The employee motivation theory posits
that job rotation helps to make work more interesting, thereby in particular providing moti-
vation for so-called“plateaued”employees, i.e., employees with limited promotion prospects.
The employee learning theory, on the other hand, contents that job rotation is an eﬀective
way to develop employees’ abilities and to improve organizational knowledge in order to
help prepare junior employees to become top managers or to better cope with uncertainty.
Last, according to the employer learning theory, job rotation improves job assignments by
providing the employer with information about the employee’s abilities, both general and
job-speciﬁc, and also job-speciﬁc factors unrelated to the employee. Though we do not see
an immediate connection to the ﬁrst of these approaches, the two tales told in this paper
suggest that the presence of conﬁrmation bias in organizations might interact with the two
latter explanations, employee and employer learning. As for employer learning, our model
about employees’ evaluation by supervisors indicates that job rotation may become an even
more valuable learning device for the ﬁrm when conﬁrmation bias is an issue because it may
prevent distortion of the signal that the employer receives. The alternative interpretation
of our model, on the other hand, in a sense links employer and employee learning theory:
though the ultimate goal of the employer is to learn where best to deploy the asset, when
conﬁrmation bias is present this may be achieved most proﬁtably by making the employee
learn to know the diﬀerent building blocks of the organization in order to broaden his view
and make him less susceptible for partial treatment of information.
In particular this last observation might be relevant for empirical analysis. In a rigor-
ous test of the afore-mentioned explanations for the practice of job rotation, Eriksson and
Ortega (2006) ﬁnd “only very limited support for the employee motivation hypothesis, [but
that] statistical evidence is more amenable to the employee learning hypothesis and employer
learning hypothesis.”27 This is correct in the sense that a number of the hypothesized re-
27 Arguing that a satisfactory test of the three major theories of job rotation should combine a representative
sample of establishments with data on employee characteristics, Eriksson and Ortega (2006) merge a
31lationships between job rotation and the set of relevant variables were found to be in the
predicted direction at a statistically signiﬁcant level, e.g. a positive correlation between the
use of job rotation and ﬁrm size or the number of hierarchical levels, which is consistent with
both employee and employer learning theory. Regarding hypotheses for which the two learn-
ing theories predict diﬀerent directions, however, there is no clear-cut result which theory
better explains the data. For example, the ﬁnding that ﬁrms that spend more to train their
employees are more likely to use job rotation schemes is favorable to the employee learning
hypothesis but contradicts the employer learning hypothesis. Tenure in the industry not
having a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on rotation, on the other hand, is consistent with the
employer learning theory but contradicts the employee learning theory. In the light of our
second story, we believe that these two theories sometimes cannot be treated separately but
have to be seen as interwoven with each other. Therefore, in order to obtain even sharper
predictions, it might be insightful to diﬀerentiate cases where the ultimate goal of employee
learning is ﬁrm learning from cases of pure employee learning.
Last, we want to point out a more directly testable implication of this paper. We have seen
that the stronger the degree of conﬁrmation bias, the more likely is job rotation the optimal
form of workplace design. In consequence, we should expect to ﬁnd rotation arrangements
more often in ﬁrms where there is more scope for conﬁrmation bias to arise. While the degree
of conﬁrmation bias might be quite diﬃcult to measure per se, there might be several ways to
operationalize its measurement. For example, based on the observation that for conﬁrmation
bias to arise there needs to be some room for misinterpretation of evidence, the extent
to which evaluation of employees is based upon subjective performance measures, which
(by their very nature) are more vague and thus more susceptible to misinterpretation than
representative survey of Danish ﬁrms with the employer-employee linked panel constructed by Statistics
Denmark, which provides data on each employee at the sampled ﬁrms. The resulting database is richer
than most surveys of establishments and provides more representative evidence than do single-ﬁrm case
studies.
32objective performance measures, might serve as an indicator for the presence and strength
of conﬁrmation bias.
A Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 3
In order to give the proof some structure, we proceed in several steps.
Claim 1: p(2 0) > ¯ ¯ p iﬀ k(2) > ¯ k.
Proof: Follows immediately from rearranging. ||
Claim 2: ¯ k < 1 iﬀ   > ¯  .
Proof: Rearranging yields
¯ k < 1 ⇐⇒  
2 −
2¯ y
(¯ y − θH)
  +
¯ y
(¯ y − θH)
< 0 
Deﬁne
f( ) :=  
2 −
2¯ y
(¯ y − θH)
  +
¯ y
(¯ y − θH)
 
Straight-forward diﬀerentiation reveals that f( ) is a strictly convex function, f′′( ) > 0,
which reaches its minimum at   = ¯ y (¯ y − θH). The zeros of f( ) are obtained by solving



































Obviously, ¯  2 > 1, which allows us to focus on ¯  1 because we are interested only in values of
  from the interval (0 5 1). Since, by assumption, θH ∈ (0  ¯ y), we have ¯  1 ∈ (0 5 1). Thus,
with f( ) being a strictly convex function which is strictly decreasing for   < 1, letting
¯   = ¯  1 concludes the proof. ||
33Claim 3: p(h h;q) < ¯ p iﬀ   < ¯ ¯  .
Proof: Rearranging yields
p(h h;q) < ¯ p ⇐⇒  
2 −
2¯ y − q(¯ y − θH)
(1 − q)(¯ y − θH)
  +
¯ y
(1 − q)(¯ y − θH)
> 0
Deﬁne
g( ) :=  
2 −
2¯ y − q(¯ y − θH)
(1 − q)(¯ y − θH)
  +
¯ y
(1 − q)(¯ y − θH)
 
Diﬀerentiation with respect to   reveals that g( ) is a strictly convex function, g′′( ) > 0,
which reaches its minimum at   = (2¯ y −q(¯ y −θH)) 2(1−q)(¯ y −θH) > 1. The zeros of g( )
are obtained by solving
g( ) = 0 ⇐⇒ ¯ ¯  1 2 =
2¯ y − q(¯ y − θH) ±
 
q2(¯ y − θH)2 + 4θH¯ y
2(1 − q)(¯ y − θH)
Once again, we are interested in values of   from the interval (0 5 1). Since for all q ∈ (0 5 1)
we have
¯ ¯  2 =
2¯ y − q(¯ y − θH) +
 
q2(¯ y − θH)2 + 4θH¯ y
2(1 − q)(¯ y − θH)
> 1
we can focus on
¯ ¯  1 =
2¯ y − q(¯ y − θH) −
 
q2(¯ y − θH)2 + 4θH¯ y
2(1 − q)(¯ y − θH)
 
Straightforward calculations reveal that for q ∈ (0 1) we have ¯ ¯  1 ∈ (0 5 1). Thus, with g( )
being a strictly convex function which is strictly decreasing for   < 1, letting ¯ ¯  (q) = ¯ ¯  1
concludes the proof. ||
Claim 4: d¯ ¯  (q) dq > 0.
Proof: First, note that ¯ ¯  (q) is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to q for all q ∈ (0 1).
By deﬁnition of ¯ ¯  (q), the following identity holds:
g(¯ ¯  (q)) = ¯ ¯  (q)
2 −
2¯ y − q(¯ y − θH)
(1 − q)(¯ y − θH)
¯ ¯  (q) +
¯ y
(1 − q)(¯ y − θH)
≡ 0
34Rearranging and diﬀerentiation with respect to q yield
d¯ ¯  (q)
dq
=
(¯ y − θH)¯ ¯  (q)(¯ ¯  (q) − 1)
2¯ y(¯ ¯  (q) − 1) − 2θH¯ ¯  (q) − q(¯ y − θH)(2¯ ¯  (q) − 1)
 
In the proof of Claim 3 we established that ¯ ¯  (q) ∈ (0 5 1) for q ∈ (0 1), which immediately
implies d¯ ¯  (q) dq > 0. ||
Claim 5: ∀q ∈ (0 1), 0 5 < ¯   < ¯ ¯  (q) < 1.
Proof: In Claim 2 and 3 we have already established that ¯   ∈ (0 5 1) and ¯ ¯  (q) ∈ (0 5 1).
It remains to show that ¯   < ¯ ¯  (q) for all q ∈ (0 1). Note that ¯ ¯  (q) is a continuous and
















= ¯   
From Claim 4, we know that d¯ ¯  (q) dq > 0 for q ∈ (0 1), which establishes the result. ||
Combining Claims 1-5 establishes the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let p(σ1 σ2;qr) denote the ﬁrm’s updated posterior belief about the true state of the world
being θ = θH after receiving report (σ1 σ2) ∈ M from the worker under a job design which
places the worker in r ∈ {1 2} divisions during the ﬁrst period. The expected return from
allocating the asset to project B exceeds the expected return from allocating the asset to
project A if and only if p(σ1 σ2;qr) exceeds
¯ p =
¯ R
¯ R + ∆
∈ (0 5 1) 
Since   ∈ (0 5 1) implies that p(l l;qr) < p(l h;qr) = p(h l;qr) = 0 5 < p(h h;qr) for
r ∈ {1 2}, the following observation follows immediately.
Lemma 4: For r ∈ {1 2}, if p(h h;qr) ≥ ¯ p, then Br = {(h h)}. Otherwise Br = ∅.
35It is readily veriﬁed, that  ∗(q)  ∗∗(q) is increasing in q, which implies that p(h h;q) is
decreasing in q. With the question of interest being whether the ﬁrm can beneﬁt from
implementing job rotation compared to specialization, this observation renders the case where
p(h h;q2) < ¯ p uninteresting. In this case, B1 = B2 = ∅, i.e., under both types of job design
the asset is allocated to the riskless project A irrespective of the worker’s report. Thus,
job rotation can never be optimal because it comes along with additional costs without
providing any beneﬁt. This leaves us with two cases in which there is scope for job rotation
to outperform specialization due to a more accurate probability assessment. In the ﬁrst of
these cases, ¯ p ≤ p(h h;q1), the allocation rule is the same under both types of job design,
B1 = B2 = {(h h)}. In the second case, p(h h;q1) < ¯ p ≤ p(h h;q2), allocation rules diﬀer,
B1 = ∅ and B2 = {(h h)}.
It can be shown that p(h h;q) > ¯ p if and only if   > ¯ ¯  (q), where
¯ ¯  (q) =
2 ¯ R − q( ¯ R − ∆) −
 
q2( ¯ R − ∆)2 + 4 ¯ R∆
2(1 − q)( ¯ R − ∆)
with ¯ ¯  ′(q) > 0 and ¯ ¯  (q) ∈ (0 5 1) for all q ∈ (0 1). These properties of ¯ ¯  (q) follow immedi-
ately from the proof of Lemma 3. The following observation then is immediate.
Lemma 5: Given ¯ R, ∆, and 0 < q2 < q1 < 1, we have
(a′) ¯ p ≤ p(h h;q1) < p(h h;q2) iﬀ   ∈ [¯ ¯  (q1) 1) ;
(b′) p(h h;q1) < ¯ p ≤ p(h h;;q2) iﬀ   ∈ [¯ ¯  (q2)  ¯ ¯  (q1)) .
In both cases (a′) and (b′), job rotation can outperform specialization if the cost of job
rotation is suﬃciently small. To formally establish this result, let P(q) denote the probability
of two h signals being reported for a given q. Moreover, let E[R|r] denote the ﬁrm’s ex-ante
expected return from asset allocation under a job design with r ∈ {1 2}.
Case (a′): Both types of job design lead to the same allocation rule, B1 = B2 = {h h}.
Thus, E[R|2] > E[R|1] if and only if
P(q2)p(h h;q2)( ¯ R + ∆) + (1 − P(q2)) ¯ R − c > P(q1)p(h h;q1)( ¯ R + ∆) + (1 − P(q1)) ¯ R 
36or equivalently, if and only if c < ¯ c, where
¯ c =
 (1 −  )(q1 − q2)( ¯ R − ∆)
2
 
Case (b′): Under specialization we have B1 = ∅, whereas under job rotation the allocation
rule is B2 = {h h}. Thus, E[R + y|2] > E[R + y|1] if and only if
P(q2)p(h h;q2)( ¯ R + ∆) + (1 − P(q2)) ¯ R − c > ¯ R 
or equivalently, if and only if c < ¯ ¯ c, where
¯ ¯ c =
 (  + q2(1 −  ))∆ − (1 −  )((1 −  ) + q2 ) ¯ R
2
 
It is readily veriﬁed that ¯ ¯ c > 0 whenever   ∈ (¯ ¯  (q2)  ¯ ¯  (q1)).
This establishes the desired result.
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